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1 Introduction and plan
A global recession has happened and we need to ask ourselves some funda-
mental questions:
1. Was it predictable? Many observers and economists (including econo-
metricians) were taken by surprise by the advent and strength of the
recession.
2. What were its causes, and how did they manifest themselves? Keep in
mind that causes and symptoms can diﬀer. For example, many believe
the recession was caused by the ﬁnancial crisis, but this is only partly
true as we shall see.
3. Is the recovery robust? What should we expect next? Can policymak-
ers learn any lessons to soften the next recession (there will certainly
be another one) and to come out of this one without hiccups?
1This note presents some answers to these questions in an accessible way.
Reference is given to the technical work underlying this note.
2 Patterns and predictions
The crisis was predicted by a few, including myself on two public occasions.
The ﬁrst of these was my inaugural lecture at Imperial College on 21 June
2007, the second being a Bank of England (BoE) seminar on 15 August 2007,
before the subprime crisis hit the US. Back then I said that a recession will
happen if the US does not reduce interest rates, and it will be transmitted
to the rest of the world.
Lest the reader thinks I am a prophet of doom, the recovery was also
predictable and I did so in a Distinguished Visiting Professor’s general talk
at the American University in Cairo on 22 April 2009. I said then that the
US will recover ﬁrst, within a year, but that Europe will take longer and will
be worse oﬀ in the meantime. The lecture is available on their website and
mine.
These are not crystal-ball predictions! In Abadir and Talmain (2002),
the solution of a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the economy
presented us with a new type of dynamics not seen hitherto in the academic
literature. The paper demonstrated the need for new and unconventional
econometric techniques that were later introduced in Abadir, Caggiano, and
Talmain (2005) for single variables, then Abadir and Talmain (2008) for
multiple variables. This line of work is summarized in Abadir and Talmain
(2010).
2Policymakers must be able to read what the data say, if they are to act
in a timely and proportionate way. If there is a practical message to be
retained from Abadir et al. (2005) in particular, it is the following. Our
model predicts that changes in economic policy take time to work through
the system, but not in a gradual way as was previously thought. Instead,
there is a long sequence of small signs of a slowdown, then a seemingly abrupt
decline. Existing models cannot cope with these patterns. When only the
small signs have appeared, no-one using existing models would be able to
guess the substantial turning point that is about to occur. This is because
these models misinterpret the inertia and project it into the future, hence
missing the ‘sudden’ turns.
What are the implications of the model for policymakers? If a policy
intervention is needed to counter the signs of a slowdown, the stimulus that
is applied to the economy:
1. should be timed to start well before the abrupt decline;
2. will take a long time to have an impact (and will eventually wear oﬀ);
3. should be suﬃciently aggressive to achieve the objective, but take into
account the increments that will keep occurring afterwards; and
4. revert to a neutral stance well before the objective is achieved, letting
the economy ease onto its intended path.
Consequently, a gradualist macroeconomic policy will not yield the de-
sired results: it will be a case of too little and too late.
33 Causes and symptoms
So where did the crisis come from, on the ground, and how would it show up
in the calculations? This can be summarized in three subsections, two about
the sectors where the crisis hit, and one about the interaction between them.
3.1 The real economy
The initial trigger was a macro slowdown that occurred as early as 2006, pos-
sibly due to the increasingly high oil prices and other factors. The sequence
was:
1. Proﬁt warnings and restructuring announcements. There was
a series of unusualy large number of such announcements, coming from
a wide cross-section of US-listed corporations that are a bellwether for
the economy. As a result of these, future layoﬀs were already announced
and their eﬀect was inevitable. Before we go on to analyze these eﬀects,
we remind the readers that our model is a micro-founded one where
e c o n o m y - w i d es h o c k sa r et h em o s tp o t e n ts o u r c eo fd i s t u r b a n c et h a t
gets ampliﬁed; see Abadir and Talmain (2002, pp. 763, 770).
2. Income reduction. Apart from proﬁts coming in lower than expected,
on a national level, the announced layoﬀsw o u l da ﬀect the labour force,
especially at the lower-income end where the propensity to consume is
highest.
3. Housing crisis. With the dip in income came a dip in demand for
housing and inability to pay back mortgages (including defaults). The
4reduction in house prices started a bursting of the ﬁnancial bubble.
4. Consumer spending dip. This followed as a result of the previous
two items. There was a double whammy of income and wealth eﬀects
on consumption.
5. Cut in investments. With reduced demand came further cuts in
investments. Apart from it being the logical conclusion of the ﬁrst
round of the vicious circle, it was evidenced in the markets by further
rounds of restructuring announcements being made by the same cor-
porations, such as the telecom giant Nortel that eventually went bust.
The short-term annoucements carried the news of more layoﬀs, but also
important was the longer-term eﬀect of a reduction in investment: a
shrinking productive capacity.
And the vicious circle went on.
3.2 The banking sector
The incentive systems in the ﬁnancial sector were (and still are) based on
returns only, and not on any measure of risk. Bonuses are paid within a year,
whereas the riskiness of the deal (e.g. loan) is revealed over time, but it is
too late to adjust the bonus. (The trader/manager may have even moved on
elsewhere.) The result is a moral-hazard problem, encouraging risk-taking.
In the frail economy described in the past subsection, defaults increase
in a snowball eﬀect. The banks take a large hit (they need better dynamic
measures of risk) and their reaction feeds back into the real economy as we
shall see.
53.3 Feedback from the banking sector to the rest
Then there is a knee-jerk reaction: banks wake up to ‘risks’ and cut lending.
The banks holding back lending is eﬀectively a contraction of the money sup-
ply, via the money-supply multiplier. This is equivalent to a more restrictive
monetary policy, even if interest rates were kept constant by Central Banks
(CBs). It needed to be neutralized by governments and CBs, with additional
liquidity and loan guarantee schemes for banks (unusual) and depositors
(mostly in existence already).
But what if the initial macro trigger was not there? The ﬁnancial sys-
tem would have continued to ‘work’ (a better description would be ‘limp
along’). The ﬁnancial markets would display excess volatility and overreac-
tion to events. The real economy would have to cope with higher uncertainty:
investment spending would be more volatile and/or less forthcoming, with
negative eﬀects on the productive capacity of the economy.
4 Lessons learnt? What next?
As predicted, the recession is out in the US, while Europe struggles. Given
the analysis listed earlier, can we say that the crisis is resolved? A recession
will happen again (by the deﬁnition of high and low), but this type of crisis
is diﬀerent. Unfortunately, we have had only a ﬁx, not the structural ad-
justment that is needed to prevent the same type of crisis from happening
again.
64.1 Problems with current policy, 1: macro reaction
The resuscitation of a patient is harder than having stopped the bleeding in
the ﬁrst place! Prompt intervention can prevent problems from developing.
The US apart, CBs were way too late and timid in their reaction. The US
Fed reacted admirably once it had identiﬁed the problem, albeit with a delay
of about a year. The lesson should be learnt for the next slowdown, and the
correct macroeconomic model (hence predictor) should be used.
4.2 Problems with current policy, 2: banking regula-
tion
There are two main points to address. The issue of moral hazard is still
with us: the capping of boards’ compensation is not the relevant answer, nor
are share-option schemes1 for employees. Incorrect risk measurement (hence
incorrect risk management and monitoring) still prevails.
One simple solution for the moral hazard is deferred cash compensation
(which exists already, but rarely): the bonus from a deal goes into a de-
p o s i tt h a tc a nb ew i t h d r a w na f t e r years, but not before, and only if the
deal is revealed not to be a write-oﬀ. The problem in its implementation is
that ﬁnancial institutions compete for talent, and this is why international
regulation is required on this.
One solution for the risk measurement issue can be implemented rela-
tively easily. The development of the relevant theory has progressed a lot:
1These are subject to prisoners’ dilemma: if your colleagues in the bank are taking
risks, you’d better do the same and get a bonus regardless of whether or not the company
survives.
7from variance to value-at-risk (one-tail risk), extreme-value theory (already
well developed in statistics and implemented in a variety of real-life engineer-
ing problems); from i.i.d. models to ones with to heterogeneous ﬁrms that
interact, and ones with dynamics (including predictive macroeconomic indi-
cators). These developments are continuing. Regulators and ﬁrms should be
at the forefront of these techniques and use them in their monitoring. It is
impossible for regulators to muster the resources to match even a fraction
of one of their watched banks. A large burden of supervision therefore falls
internally on the ﬁrm. Shareholders should be informed of the latest bench-
mark measures and how their company is performing on these. Boards of
directors should be made liable for large losses incurred by mismanagement
of their ﬁrm.
4.3 Problems with current policy, 3: prospects of slip-
ping back or inﬂation?
Because of the shrinking productive capacity (see earlier) coupled with gener-
ous government spending and expansive monetary policy, there will be a risk
of demand-pull inﬂation this time (unlike the cost-push of the 70’s). Gov-
ernment deﬁcits must be reduced, but not through tax increases across the
board (beware of Ricardian equivalence). Fiscal constraints may require the
reallocation of the tax burden. Already, Europe has started cutting budget
deﬁcits, but prematurely because the recovery has not taken hold and the
early signs of overheating have not happened yet; cf. the ﬁrst item of the
sequence in Subsection 3.1. Europe and the US are on increasingly diverg-
ing paths with regard to ﬁscal restraint and recovery/inﬂation. Export-led
8economies in Europe will do well, but the others will slow down again due to
the ﬁscal cuts.
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